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ABSTRACT: The paper demonstrates four general mechanisms that may affect economically 
valuable species when exposed to biological invasion. We distinguish between an ecological 
level effect and an ecological growth effect. In addition we present an economic quantity effect 
working through demand. Finally we suggest that there is an economic quality effect that 
reflects the possibility that invasions affect the harvesting agents directly through new 
demand-side forces. For example, this may occur because the state of the original species or 
the ecosystem is altered. We depart from the existing literature by revealing ecological and 
economic forces that explain why different agents may lack incentives to control invasions. 
The theoretical model is illustrated by the case where escaped farmed salmon influence wild 
Atlantic salmon fisheries. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last few decades, there has been increasing concern about invasive species in 
various ecosystems. Holmes (1998) argued that invasive alien species are the second most 
important cause of biodiversity loss worldwide, beaten only by habitat alteration. In some 
instances, invasive species are introduced to a new environment in order to obtain some 
recreational or commercial gain. Perhaps the most famous case is the release of 24 wild 
rabbits by Thomas Austin for sport hunting on his property in Australia in 1859, which had 
far-reaching consequences (All-science-fair-projects 2004). In other instances, human activity 
indirectly has allowed intruders to establish themselves in a new environment by disturbing 
the natural balance in the environment, e.g. via pollution. In addition, humans have 
accidentally brought invasive species to new places as stowaways in cargos. One well-known 
example is the Zebra mussels from the Caspian Sea that were introduced to the Great Lakes in 
the USA via ballast water from a transoceanic vessel in the 1980s (Great Lakes Science 
Centre 2000). Although the economic consequences of non-indigenous species are recognized 
as important, there have been few attempts to quantify them. This is due to a lack of good 
data, as well as uncertainties and measurement problems when facing the many components 
that are difficult to quantify accurately (Perrings et al. 2000). One exception is Pimentel et al. 
(1999), who estimated total economic damages and associated control costs due to invasive 
species in the USA to be $138 million per year. 
 
Several authors in Perrings et al. (2000) dealt with the economics of biological invasions. A 
general model set-up was given in Barbier (2001). As in Knowler and Barbier (2000), the 
focus was on separating the ex-post and ex-ante economic consequences of biological 
invasions. Knowler and Barbier studied the introduction of comb jelly (Mnemiopsis leidyi) in 
the Black Sea and its impact on the commercial Black Sea anchovy fishery. Knowler et al. 
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(2001) examined the extent to which pollution control could have prevented the ecological 
regime shift imposed by the comb jelly. Higgins et al. (1997) investigated alternative 
responses to the invasion of a woody species that has displaced a native plant species, in a 
situation where both species are valuable. Settle and Shogren (2002) developed a general 
model to study the introduction into Yellowstone Lake of exotic lake trout, which pose a risk 
to the native cutthroat trout. In their model, park managers, operating as social planners, 
divided their budget between controlling the lake trout and an alternative service, the 
improvement of a non-species good. By contrast, humans divided their time into either 
species consumption or spending leisure time on a non-species composite good. Eiswerth and 
van Kooten (2002), Horan et al. (2000), Olson and Roy (2002), and Shogren (2000) studied 
uncertainty with respect to species invasion. Several authors, including Buhle et al. (2004) 
and Hill and Greathead (2000), studied cost effective control. In a joint TC-CV study, Nunes 
and van den Bergh (2004) explored the extent to which people value protection against exotic 
species. 
 
In this paper, we analyze yet another potential concern, namely the influence escaped farmed 
species may have on the natural habitants. More specifically, we study the effects that escaped 
farmed salmon may have on wild Atlantic salmon. Norway has been the world leader in 
farmed salmon since this technique was pioneered in the early 1960s. Production has risen 
rapidly from about 600 tonnes in 1974 to about 500 000 tonnes today (Bjørndal 1990, 
Statistics Norway 2004). Salmon farming is one of the most important industries in rural 
Norway, with a yearly first-hand value (landed value) of about 10 billion Norwegian kroner 
(NOK) (1.3 billion EUR). However, since the very beginning of the salmon farming industry, 
salmon have unintentionally been allowed to escape from net pens that are damaged by 
storms, seals, and otters, or by daily wear and tear. The number of accidental escapes 
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decreased in the mid-1990s because of safety investments in the sea ranches. Nevertheless, 
approximately 400 000 salmon still escape yearly from fish farms in Norway (Table 1), a 
number exceeding the average total wild spawning stock (NOU 1999). 
 
The wild Atlantic salmon stock is traditionally harvested in two different fisheries in Norway 
during its spawning run. First, the marine commercial fishery catches about 40% of the 
spawning biomass in fishnets in the fjords and inlets. The escapement from this fishery enters 
the rivers and is harvested by a recreational fishery. When the fishing season in the river 
closes, the escapement from these sequential fisheries takes part in the reproduction process in 
the river in the late autumn. 
 
Spawning escaped farmed salmon (EFS) may have a number of negative effects on the natural 
growth and economic value of wild salmon. The most important effects are the spread of 
diseases and the mixing of genes through interbreeding, which affect the reproduction rate as 
well as the intrinsic value of the wild salmon. Farmed salmon digs in the natives’ spawning 
gravel, get more aggressive and risk willing offspring (NOU 1999:9), and increases the sea 
lice density (Grimnes et al. 1996). However, escaped farmed salmon may also have positive 
effects. Farmed salmon can potentially increase the salmon stock available for both marine 
and recreational harvests, ceteris paribus, and thus improve the profitability of these fisheries. 
As reported in table 1, escaped farmed salmon constitute a substantial part of catches. This is 
not to say that invasion is no problem for the society as a whole, but it may reveal economic 
forces inducing lack of incentives for different agents to control the invasion. These 
mechanisms are ignored in the previous literature.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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The analysis in this paper differs from the previous studies in various ways. First, the model 
formulation is more general as it encompasses both ex ante and ex post effects of invasions 
within the same model framework. Knowler and Barbier (2000) stressed the importance of 
comparing the ex ante with the ex-post invasion case. We distinguish between changing 
ecological and economic forces, which have potentially different effects depending on the 
initial state. This focus allows us to depart from the stylized ex ante versus ex post framework 
as the biological and economic consequences may change with different levels of invasion. 
The constant ecological structural shift proposed by Knowler and Barbier (2000) is replaced 
by a shift that depends on the magnitude of the invasive influx.  
 
Second, the general problem of invasion as a result of escapement from fish farms raises some 
specific new problems that have not yet been considered. We address one of these problems 
by explicitly taking into account the potentially ambiguous effect of biological invasion 
through demand-side effects. In many respects, it may be impossible for the different 
harvesters to separate the wild and escaped species that they catch. Hence, if invasion 
increases the total stock, demand may increases due to what will be called the economic 
quantity effect1. However, it is relatively easy to discover whether there are genetic 
differences or variations between the wild and the reared species through genetic 
investigation. Hence, knowledge about the composition of the catch, as well as the 
composition of the breeding stock, is often available. Thus, harvesters know the likelihood of 
getting a farmed instead of a wild salmon. Furthermore, harvesters may be concerned about 
the health of the wild stock due to crossbreeding when the share of invasive salmon in the 
breeding stock is high. This could be related directly to the existence value of the genetically 
                                                 
1 More generally, this effect reflects all situations in which the invasive species is connected to a harvest value.  
 6
wild species or to the loss of biodiversity due to gene flow from the reared to the wild species. 
Another interpretation is that harvesters simply prefer to harvest "clean" or "pure" wild 
Atlantic salmon. This will be called the economic quality effect. The two economic effects 
both affect the economic equilibrium condition. 
 
Next, on the ecological side there are two effects, which work in opposite directions: the 
ecological growth effect, which is negative, and the ecological level effect, which is positive. 
In the specific case of EFS, the former effect reflects a general decrease in the growth rate of 
the wild salmon due to crossbreeding, whereas the latter reflects the yearly influx of escaped 
salmon that add to the total salmon stock (see below).2 Analogous to the economic effects, 
these ecological effects both affects the ecological equilibrium condition.  
 
We also analyse the consequences of invasions when there is a sequential harvest of both the 
invasive and the wild stock. When the composition of the catch, in terms of the share of the 
invasive species, differs between the various harvesters, we gain an additional management 
tool. By altering the share of the total harvest between the different harvesters, we can change 
the composition of the escapement from these sequential fisheries (Appendix B). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two formulates an ecological model for 
the Atlantic salmon species, and section three defines the ecological equilibrium. In section 
four, the economics of the river fishery are examined and the economic equilibrium condition 
is defined. Next, in section five, the results are combined to establish the bioeconomic 
                                                 
2 Note that in the case where genetic differences between native and alien species are high, as e.g. in Knowler 
and Barbier (2000), crossbreeding is not an option, and hence only the ecological growth effect applies. 
However, in such cases, there is clearly an analogue to this level effect if the invasive species is exposed to 
harvesting. 
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equilibrium. In section six, the model is illustrated by utilizing ecological and economic data 
from the Norwegian river Orkla. Section seven concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Ecological Model 
First, we consider a wild fish stock in the absence of escaped farmed salmon. The size of the 
wild population in biomass (or number of fish) at the beginning of the fishing season in year t 
is tX . Both a marine and a river fishery act on the salmon during the spawning run from its 
offshore environment to the coast, where reproduction takes place in its parent or ´home` 
river. The marine fishery impacts on the stock first because this harvest takes place in the 
fjords and inlets before the salmon reaches their spawning river (see figure 1). For a marine 
harvest rate 0 1th≤ ≤ , the number of wild fish removed from the population is t th X . 
Accordingly, the escapement to the home river is 1,(1 )t t th X S− = . The river fishery exploits 
this spawning population along the upstream migration. When the harvesting fraction there is 
0 1ty≤ ≤ , the river escapement is 1, 2,(1 )(1 ) (1 )t t t t t ty h X y S S− − = − = . This spawning stock 
hence yields a subsequent recruitment ( )2,tR S  to the stock in year t τ+ , where τ  is the time 
lag from spawning to maturation age (see e.g. Walters, 1986).3 Throughout the analysis, it is 
assumed that the stock-recruitment relationship ( ).R  is of the Sheperd type, with ( ). 0R′ ≥ , 
( ). 0R′′ ≤  and ( )0 0R =  (more details below) (Sheperd 1982). The fraction of the recruits that 
survive up to mature age t τ+  is 0 1z< < . Further, we assume that none of the spawners 
survive and we write the population dynamics when there is no invasion as ( )2,t tX zR Sτ+ = 4. 
 
                                                 
3 See Clark (1976) for an analysis of the dynamics of a delay-difference recruitment model. 
4 Hvidsten et al. (2004) find that only 0.3%-3.8% of the spawners survive justifying this simplifying assumption.  
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The influx of escaped farmed salmon (EFS) into the ecosystem is a yearly event. We assume 
that all EFS take part in the upstream migration. As the escapement is due to unintentional 
releases from the fish farms, FX , is exogenous and not subject to an equation of motion.  
 
As already indicated, the invasive EFS have two important ecological effects, the ecological 
growth effect and the ecological level effect. First, as in Knowler and Barbier (2000), the 
ecological growth effect reflects the fact that the population dynamics of the resident species 
is structurally altered by the establishment of the invader species (farmed salmon) FX . This 
effect hence indicates the extent to which the growth function is negatively affected by 
crossbreeding (gene flow), destruction of breeding nests, and competition for food due to the 
invasion (see Hindar et al. 1991, Lura 1990, Lura and Sægrow 1991, McGinnity et al. (2003) 
and Fleming et al. (2000)). In general we allow the negative ecological growth effect to be 
increasing, decreasing or constant with the number of EFS (see below). The ecological level 
effect, on the other hand, reflects the fact that the EFS add to the wild stock through a yearly 
influx. Knowler and Barbier (2000) analysed a situation where the invader preys upon the 
resident species, and hence their model have negative effect on recruitment. In our case, a 
kind of predatory behaviour occurs when the EFS dig up wild fish spawning nests, but the 
EFS also spawn themselves. We define wild fish as all salmon that originate from river 
spawning. Hence, by assumption, offspring is defined as wild fish, even if recruitment may 
contain hybrids (crossbreedings of wild and reared salmon) and the offspring of two farmed 
parents.5  
 
                                                 
5 In doing so, we neglect one aspect of biological invasion because the negative effect on the gene flow due to 
inbreeding will continue in the next generation (Fleming et al. 2000). However, this influence on the wild fish 
population is partly taken into account by the structural shift (growth function shifting down). 
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The spawning fraction of the salmon stock is harvested together with the escaped farmed 
salmon, FX (again, see figure 1). However, only a proportion of the escaped fish is available 
to harvest because the reared salmon typically starts its spawning migration later than the wild 
stock (Lura and Sægrov 1993, NOU 1999). Hence, only the fraction FaX  is available in the 
marine fishery, where 0 1a≤ ≤ . Accordingly, with the marine fishery harvesting fraction th , 
the escapement of reared fish from the marine harvest is (1 ) Fth aX− . The fraction not 
available in the marine fishery is (1 ) Fa X− . Hence, the total stock after the marine fishery 
season ends is 1,(1 ) F Ft tah X S− = . Moreover, as most of the escaped farmed salmon enter the 
river after the fishing season finishes, only the fraction 0 1b≤ ≤  is available for sport fishing 
(Fiske et al. 2000). We denote the stock that is available in the river fishery as 
1,(1 )
F F
t tb ah X bS− = . Hence, with the harvesting fraction yt, the fraction Ft ty bS is harvested in the 
river. Accordingly, (1 ) Ft ty bS−  survives to be part of the spawning stock. In addition, the 
spawning stock includes the part of the stock that enters the river after the fishing season 
closes, (1 ) Ftb S− . The part of the stock that enters the spawning stock in the river in a given 
year t  is therefore 1, 2,(1 ) F Ft t tby S S− = . Consequently, the recruitment function with EFS is 
written as: 
 
(1) 2, 2, 2,,
F F
t t t tX zR S S S+τ ⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ . 
 
The first term in the brackets represents the positive ecological level effect of the yearly influx 
of EFS, contributing to recruitment in the same manner as the wild stock. The negative 
ecological growth effect in the recruitment function is indicated by the last term in the 
brackets. Notice that this differs from Knowler and Barbier (2000), who considered a constant 
structural shift, whereas we consider a marginal effect from the EFS. Generally, the negative 
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ecological growth effect may be increasing, decreasing or constant with the level of EFS as 
discussed below.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3. The Ecological Equilibrium 
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on an equilibrium model, rather than the dynamic 
forces, because our main goal is to establish the driving forces that follow an invasion.6 
Although we do not claim that the dynamic forces are negligible, we argue that the gain in 
analytical tractability from neglecting the dynamic forces offsets the loss of details in regard 
to the short-term dynamics.7  
 
Following the approach taken by Anderson (1983, 1993), McConnel and Sutinen (1989), and 
Lee (1996), we measure recreational fishing effort in terms of the number of daily fishing 
permits sold.8 In real life, fishing permits may be for one day, one week, or a whole season. 
However, as in Skonhoft and Logstein (2003), we collapse these possibilities into one-day 
permits because these are the most common type. Thus, the fishing effort is directly expressed 
in terms of the number of day permits, D . (Again, the effect of FX  is ambiguous, as will be 
discussed below.) We assume the offtake in the river follows the Schaefer-type harvest 
function. Hence, the total river yield is written as: 
 
(2) 1 1FY qD S bS⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ , 
 
                                                 
6 For the same reason, the marine harvest rate h is kept in the background, entering the model exogenously.  
7 See e.g. Olaussen and Skonhoft (2005) for a dynamic analysis of recreational fishing. 
8 Others have used a different approach – for instance, Bishop and Samples (1980), Cook and McGaw (1996) 
and Laukkanen (2001) use the actual catch.  
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where Y is the total offtake, q  is the catchability coefficient, and D  is effort measured in 
number of fishing days. The content in the bracket on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the 
total biomass that is available in the recreational fishery. Moreover we have that the total 
offtake in the river per definition writes 
 
(3)  1 1
FY y S bS⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Hence, from equation (2) and (3) it follows that the fishing mortality fraction y qD= . For a 
given marine harvest rate h , the equilibrium version of equation (1) is written 
 
(4) 
( ) ( )
( )
2 2 2 1 1 1, (1 ) (1 ) , (1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) , (1 )(1 )
F F F F
F F
X zR S S S zR qD S bqD S bqD S
zR qD h X bqD ah X bqD ah X
= + = − + − −
= − − + − − − −
. 
 
The total differential of the equilibrium condition (4) with respect to the stock and fishing 
effort yields ( ) ( )( )2 2 2 2
.. ( ) ..
1 .. ( )
F F
D D
F
X
zR S S zR SdX
dD zR S S
′′ ′ ′+ += ′ ′− +   . Both terms in the numerator are 
negative as increasing the effort decreases the stock as long as ( ).. 0R′ > . The denominator is 
positive as long as ( ) 2 2.. ( ) 1F XzR S S′ ′+ < . Hence, we find that the ecological equilibrium 
condition is decreasing in the X-D plane as long as ( ) 2 20 .. ( ) 1F XzR S S′ ′< + <  hold. Note that a 
high total spawning stock yields a low growth rate and vice versa which indicate that the 
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condition to some extent are self-fulfilling. See also the numerical section below9 and 
Appendix C for more details.  
 
As discussed above, shifts in FX  yield two separate ecological effects, the ecological growth 
effect and the ecological level effect. Based on our assumptions, the growth function shifts 
down whenever EFS are present, and the marginal effect of EFS is constant. This means that 
the ecological equilibrium condition becomes steeper in the X-D plane due to the reduced 
growth rate of the species (see Figure 2). As we have a yearly influx of EFS, the ecological 
level effect operates in the opposite direction because, ceteris paribus, more EFS increase 
spawning. The intuition behind the ecological level effect is clear, because a given fishing 
effort is compatible with more fish when there is a yearly influx added to the stock.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Hence, based on the two conflicting ecological mechanisms, the total stock effect depends on 
the initial stock size, as indicated by the shift from curve 1 to curve 1` in Figure 2. The 
ecological level effect of the direct invasion shifts the ecological equilibrium condition out in 
the X-D plane. At the same time, the slope becomes steeper because of the structural change 
(reduced growth). Increasing the marine harvest rate always makes the ecological equilibrium 
condition steeper. Accordingly, less fishing effort in the river is compatible with the same 
stock size when the marine harvest increases. The same conclusion holds for the catchability 
parameter, in the sense that when each angler is more effective, for example because of more 
effective fishing equipment, then less fishing effort in the river is compatible with the same 
stock size. 
                                                 
9 In the rest of the paper, we only focus on the case where ( ).. 0R′ > holds because stock sizes where 0R′ <  
are unlikely to occur in real life for Atlantic salmon (see e.g. Hansen et al. 1996 and Hvidsten et al. 2004). 
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4. The Economic Equilibrium 
We now turn to the economic part of the model. Starting with demand, this is a question about 
what recreational anglers look for in the fishing experience. The price of the fishing license 
and the number of fishing days are expected to be important. However, as Anderson (1983), 
among others, emphasized, the average size of the fish caught, the total amount of fishing 
effort by all individuals, the anglers’ income, the market price of fish, companions, and the 
nature of the surroundings may also play a role. However, empirical evidence shows that two 
of the most important determinants of fishing trip satisfaction in the Norwegian Atlantic 
salmon fishery are the price of permits and the size of the catch, measured as average catch 
per day (Fiske and Aas 2001).10 As we focus on the issue of invasive species, we have added 
the above mentioned economic effects (quantity and quality) in the demand function. 
 
The inverse demand function is hence a function of the number of fishing permits, in addition 
to the size of the wild and the EFS stock: 
 
(5) 
/
( , , )FP P D X X
+ −− += . 
 
The signs above the arguments indicate the sign of the partial derivative with respect to the 
number of fishing permits, D , and the signs of the shift in the inverse demand function when 
the wild stock and the number of EFS change, respectively. The inverse demand schedule is 
downward sloping in the number of fishing days as the willingness to pay for the fishing 
experience ceteris paribus decreases. On the other hand, it shifts upwards in the P-D plane 
                                                 
10 In a survey of Norwegian rivers, 92% of sport fishermen reported that the quality of the river in terms of 
average catch per day was important. In addition, 72% reported that the price of fishing permits was important 
(Fiske and Aas 2001) 
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when the wild stock, X  , increases due to the economic quality effect. For a higher stock 
(quantity), the average catch per day increases.11 Finally, we have the ambiguous demand 
effect of EFS. The positive economic quantity effect is counterbalanced by the negative 
economic quality effect. The economic quantity effect means that, ceteris paribus, the angler 
always regards catching one more fish as positive, even if the fish is an EFS. This assumption 
is realistic because sport fishermen are rarely able to identify a salmon as an EFS, especially if 
it is not recently escaped (NOU 1999)12. 
 
The economic quality effect is always negative as it captures fishermen’s concerns about the 
share of EFS in the spawning stock.13 One of the required attributes of a fishing experience 
may be that the fish are wild. When the reported share of EFS in the breeding stock is high, 
the likelihood of any catch being a farmed salmon is higher. Given that the anglers prefer the 
genetically "clean" wild fish, a greater EFS-share may reduce their willingness to pay for the 
fishing experience. This effect may originate from a concern about the state of a specific 
river’s salmon stock, or simply from the fishermen’s self-interested regard to their own catch, 
or both. However, the cause is of minor importance here, as the main point is to establish that 
the economic quality effect is negative. For a given EFS level, this negative effect decreases as 
the wild stock increases because the share of EFS in the total stock decreases (again, see the 
specification below). Moreover, the economic quality effect is assumed to be stronger when 
the share of EFS in the spawning stock is higher.  
 
                                                 
11 See also Olaussen and Skonhoft (2005) for more details on this shift in demand. 
12 Recently escaped (adult) farmed fish is often characterized by poorly developed and damaged fins, especially 
the caudal (tail) fin, small gills, skin bruises and general deformations. However, these signs are rarely observed 
when the fish escapes at an early life stage.    
13 These numbers are reported from yearly biological investigations of the spawning stock. This means that 
information about the average share of EFS in the spawning population is available and, in many cases, part of 
the common knowledge of anglers. 
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On the supply side, the landowners take into account the cost of selling fishing permits, ( )C D . 
This cost is generally related to the activities undertaken by the landowners in order to 
provide the permit, such as advertising, administration, and supervision, as well as the 
construction and maintenance of parking lots, tracks, fishing huts, and so forth. Generally, 
there are fixed as well as variable costs. 
 
We assume myopic, monopolistic management of the river. The traditional view is that even a 
very small spawning stock is able to fully replenish the river, so there is little reason for the 
landowners to consider the next generation stock. Therefore, they act as de facto myopic 
resource managers (treating the salmon stock as exogenous). Another possible explanation for 
this short-sighted behaviour is that, due to the time lag in recruitment, the landowners know 
that recruitment does not return for at least five years (τ=5). As the landowners cannot control 
the marine fishery, the harvest in the fjords induces an extra source of uncertainty about future 
stock. Furthermore, the argument for myopic resource management seems to be even stronger 
in the case of EFS, as EFS add to the complexity observed by the river manager with respect 
to the salmon stock. The monopolistic assumption means that the river landowners, who offer 
fishing permits to the recreational anglers, are able to take advantage of the downward slope 
of the demand curve. The assumption of monopolistic behaviour fits with the behaviour of 
Norwegian landowners in a typical large salmon river, where salmon tourism forms a 
noteworthy part of the landowner’s income. By contrast, price-taking behaviour exists in 
many small rivers, as indicated by Olaussen and Skonhoft (2005). The river fishery profit 
writes ( , , ) ( )FP D X X D C Dπ = − , and accordingly, the first-order condition is: 
 
(6) 0DP D P C′ ′+ − = . 
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The first-order condition gives the number of fishing permits as a function of the fish stock. 
Note that the stock size affects this first order-condition only through demand because the 
myopic landowners do not take the stock size effect into account in the profit function as 
mentioned above. Differentiation of the first-order condition yields 
[ ]2 D D XP P D C dD P dX′ ′′ ′′ ′+ − = − . Assuming that the second-order condition for the maximum 
holds, the content in the bracket on the left-hand side is negative. Hence, the economic 
equilibrium condition is positively sloped in the X-D plane. The interpretation is clear-cut as 
more fish are compatible with more fishing permits because demand increases. The permit 
sale is positive only if the willingness to pay for fishing permits exceeds the cost of providing 
them. Hence, the minimum level of the stock must yield (0, , ) (0)FP X X C≥ to ensure 
positive supply.  
 
FX  influences the economic equilibrium through the economic quantity effect and the 
economic quality effect. Depending on which effect is dominant, the economic equilibrium 
condition shifts outwards or inwards in the X-D plane when the amount of EFS increases (see 
Figure 2). The economic quantity effect shifts the equilibrium condition inwards. This means 
that the fishing effort compatible with a given stock size increases because the yearly influx 
creates increasing demand. In addition, it indicates that the minimum stock level compatible 
with positive demand decreases.  
 
On the other hand, the economic quality effect always shifts the equilibrium condition out 
because this negative effect reduces demand for a given wild stock. Which effect that 
dominates is an empirical question and is likely to vary from case to case, and, perhaps more 
important, it will depend on the initial invasion level. However, some general points can be 
made. One realistic assumption seems to be that the economic quality effect will diminish with 
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an increasing wild stock. In other words, the higher is the proportion of wild salmon in the 
total stock, the smaller will be the share of the EFS in the spawning population. Accordingly, 
the negative economic quality effect will be less. The basic idea is that the initial situation 
affects how a change in the number of EFS operates. In the P-D plane, this means that for a 
given initial stock, increasing levels of FX  shifts the inverse demand schedule up if the 
economic quantity effect dominates the economic quality effect and the vice versa. Moreover, 
for a given effort level, the inverse demand schedule is more concave in the P-X plane when 
0FX >  (see also numerical section below). This assumptions leads to the economic 
equilibrium condition depicted in Figure 2, where the economic quality effect dominates the 
economic quantity effect only for small initial wild stock sizes. The same line of arguing 
indicates that if the economic quality effect is low, then there is a greater likelihood that D will 
increase as the number of EFS increases. Moreover, if there is no economic quality effect, the 
curve simply shifts unambiguously inwards in the X-D plane due to the positive economic 
quantity effect. In addition, notice that the economic quality effect means that if the wild stock 
changes, demand respond more in the post- than in the pre-invasion case. This is because, 
post-invasion, there is an additional demand effect induced by the changing composition of 
the spawning stock. 
 
5. The Bioeconomic Equilibrium 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the bioeconomic equilibrium, in which both the ecological and 
economic equilibrium conditions are satisfied, is represented by the interception between the 
curves. Comparing the pre- and post-invasion states, that is, comparing 0FX =  (curves 1 and 
2) with XF>0 (curves 1` and 2`), we find that the effects on stock ( )X  and effort ( )D  are both 
ambiguous. This follows directly since both equilibrium conditions shift simultaneously. The 
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fact that the bioeconomic result of an invasion directly depends on the initial state highlights 
the importance of separating between different initial levels of invasion.  
 
If we concentrate on the difference between the pre-and the post-invasion situations, we are 
required to take all four effects into account. Moreover, if we are already in a post-invasion 
environment, all effects will still apply. As discussed above, and shown in Figure 2, it is not 
possible to make general statements about the stock and the number of fishing days when we 
have changes in the number of EFS. As noted, the initial situation is an important determinant 
of the consequences for stock and effort flowing from an increased invasion. For a given level 
of invasion, we find that when the level of the wild stock is low, the share of reared salmon in 
the spawning stock is relatively high. This means that the economic quality effect will be 
important, placing us on the steeper part of the economic equilibrium condition depicted in 
Figure 2. From this equilibrium, we know that the schedule shifts down and rises more 
steeply in the X-D plane at the same time. From the ecological equilibrium schedule, we find 
that the slope is flatter when the stock is low (the convex ecological equilibrium schedule), 
increasing the likelihood that X  will increase as the number of EFS increases (see Figure 2). 
Thus, both the ecological and the economic forces operate in the same direction when the 
initial stock level is low. 
 
If we turn to a situation where the level of the wild stock is high, then the share of invasive 
fish in the spawning stock is small, making the economic quality effect negligible to the sport 
anglers. As noted above, ceteris paribus this increases the likelihood that fishing effort will 
increase with an increase in the number of EFS. However, due to the steep fall in the 
ecological condition when the stock is high, the bioeconomic result is more likely to reduce 
stock and effort, as indicated in Figure 3. To come to more definite conclusions about the 
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magnitude of the different effects, we illustrate the model with an example based on the 
Norwegian Salmon River Orkla. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
6. A Numerical Illustration 
 
6.1 Data and specific functional forms 
The biological data are in accordance with a typical large Atlantic salmon river in Norway, as 
represented by the river Orkla, which is situated some 500 km north of Oslo. A biological 
investigation conducted by Hvidsten et al. (2004) provides the only data available worldwide 
that estimates the recruitment function in a large Atlantic salmon river. Moreover, the Orkla 
River is one of the "cleanest" large salmon rivers in Norway with respect to biological 
invasion. It has low levels of escaped farmed salmon in both catch statistics and the spawning 
population – according to Fiske et al. (2000), these levels average 1% and 18%, respectively. 
In the marine fisheries, Fiske et al. (2000) showed that, on average, 32% of the marine offtake 
is made up of EFS (see Appendix A for a calibration of the biological model). Biological 
research suggest that the recruitment function (..)R  is close to the Beverton Holt type, but 
that neither the Cushing nor the Ricker type recruitement can be ruled out. It is therefore 
convenient to write it as the Sheperd (1982) recruitment function14:  
(7) 
( )2 2 2
2 2
(1 )
(..)
1
F F
F
r S S S
R
S S
K
η
γ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− ε +⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,  
                                                 
14 The Sheperd function produces the Cushing recruitment function when γ<1, the Beverton Holt recruitment 
function when γ=1, and the Ricker recruitment function when γ>1. 
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where r is the maximum recruits per spawning salmon, and K is the stock level where density 
dependent mortality factors start to dominate stock independent factors.15 Finally, the 
compensation parameter γ  is the degree to which density-independent effects compensate for 
changes in stock size. The baseline parameter values are given in Appendix A. The pre-
invasion recruitment is found by setting 0FX = . Note that the marginal negative ecological 
growth effect of EFS is constant when 1η = , decreasing for 1η < , and increasing when 1η > . 
In the numerical simulations we assume 1η =  and that the restriction ( ) 1FXε <  holds16.  
 
Turning to the economic functions, we start out by defining the inverse demand function 
when there are no EFS (pre invasion): 
 
(8) 1( , , )
FP D X X qS D= α −β .  
 
The choke price α gives the maximum willingness to pay when the quality-translated catch is 
one fish per day, whereas β reflects the price response in a standard manner. In the case of 
invasion, the inverse demand function is specified as follows 
 
(9)
( )2
1 1
2
( , , )
F
F F
S
P D X X q S bS D w
S
θ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤= α + −β −⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  
 
                                                 
15 Note that the numbers reported in Hvidsten et al. (2004) are measured as recruits per egg per square metre. 
However, we have translated them into the corresponding number of recruits per spawning salmon in the river 
(available on request). 
16 Fleming et al (2000) show in a controlled experiment that the productivity of the natives are depressed by 30% 
when the share of farmed to natives in the spawning population were 57%. However, if there is an increasing or 
decreasing marginal negative impact is not analysed as it is a one-shot experiment.  
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Note that equation (9) reduces to (8) when there are no EFS present. The ambiguous demand 
effects following EFS are easiliy recognised in equation (9). The demand increases via the 
catch per day-channel inducing the economic quantity effect in the term 1
FqSα . On the other 
hand, the proportion of farmed fish in the total stock increases, leading to the economic 
quality effect that operates via the last term on the right-hand side. The specification of the 
economic quality effect means that when XF>0, the inverse demand increases at a decreasing 
rate with X in the P-X plane, as explained in section 4. This means that the smaller the level of 
the wild stock is, the more the increased invasion reduces demand through the economic 
quality effect (more on this below). All parameters are defined and the baseline values are 
given in Appendix A. Finally, the cost function is specified as 0( )C D c cD= + , where 0c  and 
c  are the fixed and the marginal costs of providing fishing permits, respectively. With these 
specifications, in the post-invasion case, we express the number of fishing permits from the 
first-order condition, 0d
dD
π = , as: 
 
(10) 
( ) 21 1
2
2
F
F Sq S S c w
S
D
θ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥α + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= β . 
 
The pre-invasion demand is found simply by introducing 0FX = (and thus 1 2 0F FS S= = ). 
Note that although the share of EFS in the spawning stock influences demand directly, 
equation (10) reflects the fact that landowners do not see their own fishing permit sales as an 
instrument to influence this share. One possible reason for this is that a very small proportion 
of the river catch consists of EFS. On the other hand, this would be an argument for the 
landowners to decrease their harvest in order to increase the share of wild salmon in the 
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spawning stock. However, consistent with our assumption that they are myopic, the 
landowners ignore the spawning stock, including the composition of wild and farmed 
spawners. Note that with no economic quality effect in demand, 0w = , the equilibrium 
condition shifts up in the X-D plane when 0FX > , and that the slope of the equilibrium 
condition changes when 0w >  and 0FX >  (see also discussion above and Appendix C for 
details). Recall also that D is more likely to increase in FX , the higher X  is, as the negative 
economic quality effect diminishes. In addition, we find that when demand is generally higher 
for a given stock size, as indicated by an increase in α , then D  is more likely to increase 
with FX . By contrast and for obvious reasons, when anglers are more concerned about 
negative EFS effects ( w↑ ) this works in the other direction.  
 
6.2 Results 
Table 2 reports the results in the pre- and post-invasion situations with the baseline parameter 
values. Note that the escapement only modestly affects the stock because the EFS have two 
contradictory effects on the wild stock (see above). Consequently, in the post-invasion case, 
the marginal stock change is largest when the escapement rate is low. For example, this could 
be a situation where safety investments in the sea farming industry have reduced the 
escapement rate, or where aquaculture is abandoned in some fjords in order to establish 
national farming free zones.17 In addition, notice that the fishing effort increases when the 
number of EFS shifts from the pre-invasion case, where EFS=0, to the post-invasion case, 
where EFS=2000, and it is almost the same as pre-invasion when EFS=4000. However, 
increasing the number of EFS further decreases the fishing effort because of the increasing 
economic quality effect, even if the stock increases. In addition, notice that the wild stock is 
not strictly increasing with an increased level of EFS, meaning that, for the baseline parameter 
                                                 
17 The Norwegian government imposed this regulation on some fjords in 2003. The fjord where the river Orkla 
runs out (Trondheimsfjorden) was established as one of the farming free zones. 
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values, the negative ecological growth effect dominates when the proportion of EFS reaches a 
certain level. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Further, in the post-invasion situation, we find that the profit may rise because of an increase 
in the invasive stock (the direct economic quantity effect). Comparing EFS=0 and EFS=2 
shows that the stock increase causes an increase in the number of fishing days, without 
affecting the permit price. This highlights an important fact, which is that, given an invasion, 
the equilibrium profit may rise with an increasing yearly influx. In other words, the yearly 
influx may hide the reduced biomass production rate. However, as long as the share of EFS in 
the spawning stock matters to the anglers, then a higher invasion level will mean the 
economic quality effect increases in importance. Hence, the fishing effort and profits may fall 
dramatically. Note that the angler surplus, and thus the total surplus in the river, follows the 
exact same pattern as the monopolistic profit. The decreasing price follows directly from the 
negative economic quality effect on demand. For the baseline invasion level, EFS=6000, the 
EFS levels in the marine harvest and the river harvest are 25% and 8% respectively, whereas 
48% of the spawning stock consists of EFS. 
 
Now, we turn to a situation where the anglers consider "a fish as a fish", both in their harvest 
and in the spawning stock.18 This means that the last term in the inverse demand function is 
neglected, w=0. The only way that the EFS translate directly into demand is through the effect 
on the overall stock. The stock increases modestly as the number of EFS increases. In 
addition, both the fishing effort and permit prices increase due to the economic quantity effect. 
                                                 
18 i.e. anglers are not concerned whether salmon is farmed or wild 
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The results reported in table 3 hence reflect this situation, where the ecological level effect on 
the wild stock dominates the ecological growth effect. Thus, one problematic aspect of 
invasion is hidden when there is no economic quality effect. When the economic quality effect 
applies, the ex-post wild stock is always higher than in the absence of this effect. This is 
because the fishing effort is higher when anglers are not concerned about the number of 
reared fish in the population. 
 
The profit, the angler surplus, and hence, the total surplus, are strictly increasing as the 
number of EFS increases. In the baseline case when EFS=6000, 26% of the marine harvest, 
9% of the river sport harvest, and 71% of the spawning stock consist of farmed salmon. This 
means that when there is an economic quality effect, the proportion of farmed to wild salmon 
in the spawning stock is reduced. However, the manner in which the concern about invasive 
species reduces this share through the economic quality effect is not straightforward. When 
demand is reduced because of the economic quality effect, the share of wild salmon in the 
spawning stock increases relative to the reared salmon share because the anglers mainly catch 
wild fish. Therefore, the mechanism is not the result of any deliberate action by the anglers to 
decrease the share of reared fish in the spawning stock, but rather, it is a fortunate 
consequence of reduced demand. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The paper demonstrates four different mechanisms that may be important when escaped 
reared species mix with their wild congeners, and thereby, we reveal some important policy 
implications. Our results indicate that, even if the growth rate of the wild species is reduced, 
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the total stock may increase when there is an ecological invasion. Hence, measures to reduce 
an invasion may very well reduce the overall surplus because less biomass will be available 
for harvest. On interesting result is that, if there is no economic quality effect, the harvesting 
effort will be higher due to the economic quantity effect and, hence, the stock will be less than 
before the invasion. In this case, the profit and the angler surplus will always be higher ex post 
the invasion, and both will increase with invasion of the farmed species. Thus, one 
consequence that follows directly from the analyses is that reporting the share of invasive 
species in an ecosystem may reduce the demand for harvesting the wild species. This will in 
turn increase the wild stock and depending on the composition of the catch, the share of 
resident species in the ecosystem may increase. Finally, the effect on overall surplus of 
shutting down one sequential harvest activity in the case of an invasion is generally 
ambiguous because the share of the invasive species in the spawning population (or 
ecosystem) may increase (see Appendix B). 
 
The mechanisms discussed in the paper may be transferable to other situations where escaped 
farmed animals mix with their wild congeners, or where an ecosystem faces a yearly influx of 
invasive species for any reason. We have demonstrated that, even taking invasive damage into 
account, in many instances, the overall surplus may rise following an invasion. Of course, this 
may have implications for incentives to reduce the escapement of farmed species. As shown, 
participants in the harvest may want invasions to persist. Perhaps more importantly, these 
economic forces, or lack of incentives, may explain why policymakers must intervene if they 
want to reduce invasions. On the other hand, one interesting extension of the model developed 
here is to incorporate a social planner managing both the marine and the recreational fishery, 
as the outcome of such planning with respect to profit, angler surplus and share of invasive in 
the spawning stock seems far from clear cut. Making the model more realistic by including 
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the spread of diseases and stochastic elements, and by taking existence value more explicitly 
into account, may alter some of the results. Nevertheless, the general driving forces described 
in the paper offer some general insights into the bioeconomics of ecological invasions. 
 
 
References: 
All-science-fair-projects (2004): http://www.all-science-fair-
projects.com/science_fair_projects_encyclopedia/Rabbits_in_Australia (2004) 
 
Anderson, L.G. (1983): “The demand curve for recreational fishing with an application to 
stock enhancement activities.” Land Economics, 59, No.3: 279-287. 
 
Anderson, L.G. (1993): “Toward a complete economic theory of the utilization and 
management of recreational fisheries.” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 24, 272-295 
 
Barbier, E.B. (2001): A note on the economics of biological invasions, Ecological Economics 
39: 197-202  
 
Bishop, R.C., and Samples, K.C. (1980): “Sport and commercial fishing conflicts. A 
theoretical analysis.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 7, 220-233 
 
Bjørndal,T. (1990): The Economics of Salmon Aquaculture, Blackwell Scientific Publications 
 
Buhle, E., Margolis, M., Ruesink, J. L. (2004): Bang for the Buck: Cost-Effective Control of 
Invasive Species with Different Life Histories, Resources for the Future, Discussion paper 
04-06 
 
Clark, C. W. (1976): A delayed-recruitment model of population dynamics, with an 
application to Baleen whale populations, Journal of Mathematical Biology 3:381-391.  
 
Clark, C. (1990): Mathematical Bioeconomics, John Wiley New York 
 27
 
Cook, B. A., and McGaw. R.L. (1996): “Sport and commercial fishing allocations for the 
Atlantic salmon fisheries of the Miramichi river.” Canadian J. of Agricultural Economics 44 
165-171 
 
Eiswerth, M.E. and van Kooten, G.C., (2002): Uncertainty, Economics, and the Spread of an 
Invasive Plant Species, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84 (5): 1317-1322 
 
Fiske, P. & Aas, Ø. (red.) (2001): Laksefiskeboka. Om sammenhenger mellom beskatning, 
fiske og verdiskaping ved elvefiske etter laks, sjøaure og sjørøye. – NINA Temahefte 20: 1-
100. (N) 
 
Fiske, P., Østborg, G.M, Fløystad, L. (2000): Rømt oppdrettslaks i sjø- og elvefisket i årene 
1989-1999, NINA oppdragsmelding 659.  
 
Fleming, I. A., K. Hindar, I.B. Mjølnerud, B. Johnsson, T. Balstad, and A. Lamberg (2000): 
“Lifetime success and interactions of farm salmon invading a native population”, Proc. R. 
Soc. Lond. B. 
 
Great Lakes Science Center 2000: GLSC Fact Sheet 2000-6, 
http://www.glsc.usgs.gov/_files/factsheets/2000-6%20Zebra%20Mussels.pdf 
 
Grimnes, A., Birkeland, K., Jakobsen, P.J., Finstad, B. (1996): Lakselus- nasjonal og 
internasjonal kunnskapsstatus, NINA fagrapport 18 
 
Higgins, S.I., Azorin, R.M., Cowling, R.M., Morris, M.J. (1997): A Dynamic Ecological-
Economic Model as a Tool for Conflict Resolution in an Invasive-Alian-Plant, Biological 
Control and Native-Plant Scenario, Ecological Economics 22: 141-154 
 
Hill, G. and Greathead, D., (2000): Economic Evaluation in Classical Biological Control, In 
Perrings, C., Williamson, M., Dalmazzone, S. (Editors): The Economics of Biological 
Invasions, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 183-297. 
 
 28
Hansen, L.P., Jonsson, B., and N. (1996): ”Overvåkning av laks fra Imsa og Drammenselva.” 
NINA oppdragsmelding 401: 1-28 
 
Hindar, K. Ryman, N. Utter, F. (1991): Genetic effects of cultured fish on Natural fish 
populations, Canadian journal of fish and aquatic science 48: 945-957.  
 
Holmes, B., (1998): Day of the Sparrow, New Scientist, June 27: 32-35 ref I Horan et al.  
 
Horan, R.D., Perrings,  C., Lupi, F., Bulte, E.W. (2002): Biological pollution prevention 
strategies under ignorance: The case of invasive species, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 84 (5): 1303-1310 
 
 
Hvidsten, N.A., Johnsen, B.O., Jensen, A.J., Fiske, P., Ugedal, O., Thorstad, E.B., Jensås, 
J.G., Bakke, Ø., Forseth, T. (2004): Orkla- et nasjonalt referansevassdrag for studier av 
bestandsregulerende faktorer av laks, Nina fagrapport 079.  
 
Knowler, D., and Barbier, E. B., (2000): The economics of an invading species: a theoretical 
model and case study application, In Perrings, C., Williamson, M., Dalmazzone, S. (Editors): 
The Economics of Biological Invasions, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 70-93. 
 
Knowler, D., Barbier, E.B., Strand, I. (2001): "An Open-Access Model of Fisheries and 
Nutrient Enrichment in the Black Sea," Marine Resource Economics 16(3):195-217. 
  
Laukkanen, M. (2001): “A Bioeconomic Analysis of the Northern Baltic Salmon Fishery: 
Coexistence versus Exclusion of Competing Sequential Fisheries.” Environmental and 
Resource Economics 18: 293-315 
 
Lee, S-T. (1996): The Economics of Recreational Fishing, University of Washington, 
Dissertation 
Lura, H. (1990): Spawning success of escaped domesticated Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar). 
Cand. scient. oppgave, Zoologisk museum, UiB.  
 
 29
Lura, H. and Sægrov, H. (1991): Documentation of successful spawning of escaped farmed 
female Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar, in Norwegian rivers. Aquaculture 98: 151-159. 
 
Lura, H. and Sægrov, H. (1993): Timing of spawning in wild and cultured Atlantic salmon 
(Salmo salar) and brown trout (Salmo trutta) in River Vosso, Norway. Ecology of Freshwater 
Fish 2: 167-172. 
 
McConnell, K.E., and Sutinen, J.G., (1979): “Bioeconomic Models of Marine Recreational 
Fishing.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 6: 127-139. 
 
McGinnity, P., P. Prodöhl, A. Ferguson, R. Hynes, N. O. Maoiléidigh, N. Baker, D. Cotter, B. 
O´Hea, D. Cooke, G. Rogan, J. Taggart and T. Cross. (2003): “Fitness reduction and potential 
extinction of wild populations of Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar, as a result of interactions with 
escaped farmed salmon”, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B.  
 
Olaussen, J.O. and Skonhoft, A. (2005): A bioeconomic analyses of the recreational wild 
Atlantic salmon (salmo salar) fishery, Working paper, Department of Economics, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology.  
 
Olson, L.J. and Roy, S. (2002): The economics of controlling a stochastic biological invasion, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84 (5): 1311-1316 
 
NOU (1999): Til laks åt alle kan ingen gjera? NOU 1999:9 
 
Nunes, P. A. L. D., and J. C. J. M. Van Den Bergh (2004): Can People Value Protection 
Against Exotic Marine Species? Evidence from a Joint TC_CV Survey in The Netherlands, 
Environmental and Resource Economics 28 (4): 517-532 
 
Perrings, C., Williamson, M., Dalmazzone, S. (Editors) (2000): The Economics of Biological 
Invasions, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
 
Pimentel, D., Lach, L., Zuniga, R., Morrison D. (1999): Environmental and economic costs 
associated with non-indigenous species in the United States, 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Jan99/species_costs.html 
 30
 
Settle, C. and Shogren, J.F. (2002): Modeling Native-Exotic Species within Yellowstone 
Lake, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84 (5): 1323-1328 
 
Shepherd, J.G. (1982): A versatile new stock-recruitement relationship for fisheries, and the 
construction of sustainable yield curves. Journal du Conseil, Conseil Internationale pour 
L`Exploration de la Mer 40 (1), 67-75  
 
Shogren, J.F. (2000): Risk reduction strategies against the ´explosive invader´, In Perrings, C., 
Williamson, M., Dalmazzone, S. (Editors): The Economics of Biological Invasions, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham: 56-69 
 
Skonhoft, A. and Logstein, R. (2003): Sportsfiske etter laks. En bioøkonomisk analyse. Norsk 
økonomisk tidsskrift 117 (1): 31-51 
 
Statistics Norway (2004): http://www.ssb.no/emner/01/03/30/ 
 
Walters, C. (1986): Adaptive management of renewable resources, Macmillan Publishing 
Company, New York 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
Appendix A 
Data and calibration 
 
Table A1: Baseline values prices and costs, ecological and other parameters 
Parameter Parameter description Value 
r Maximum recruitment per spawning salmon 270 (smolt per spawning salmon) 
γ Decides to which extent density independent factors 
compensates for stock changes 
1.06 
K 
 
Stock level where density dependent mortality dominates 
density independent factors 
1489 (number of spawning 
salmon) 
s Survival rate recruits 0.05 
α Reservation price when catch per day is 1 500 (NOK/salmon) 
β Price effect demand 0.12 (NOK/day2) 
c Marginal cost fishing permit sale 50 (NOK/day) 
c0 Fixed cost fishing permit sale 0 
q Catchability coefficient 0.0002 (1/day) 
h Marine harvest rate 0.3 
y River harvest rate 0.58 
τ Time lag recruitment spawner 5 years 
XF Invasive yearly influx 6000 
ε Negative impact recruitment by invasive 0.00001 
η Decides if the negative marginal ecological growth effect 
of EFS is increasing, decreasing or constant 
1 
a Share of invasive available for marine fishery 0.8 
b Share of invasive available for river fishery 0.2 
w 
θ 
Price effect share of invasive 
Decides if the negative marginal price effect of share of 
invasive is increasing, decreasing or constant 
0.1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Closing down the marine fishery 
 
We consider measures to change the composition of catches in the marine and river fisheries. More 
specifically, table 4 reports the results of a sea fishing ban. It is often argued that a sea fishing ban 
increases the overall profitability in salmon fisheries because the value of a sea-caught salmon is more 
or less directly related to the meat value, whereas a river-caught salmon exceeds the meat value by 
several times (see Olaussen and Skonhoft 2005). As a direct response to a sea fishing ban, more fish 
enter the river and river catches increase for a given total stock size due to increased fishing effort. For 
a given number of fishing days, the price of permits increases due to the increased catch per day. The 
fishing effort is consistently higher under a sea fishing ban than when the marine harvest rate is 
positive. However, the total quantity effect is ambiguous because more fish enter the river. In addition, 
the profit exceeds the baseline profits for all levels of EFS. However, when EFS=6000, only 8% of the 
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total EFS stock is harvested, leaving the remaining 92% to take part in the spawning process. Hence, 
57% of the spawning biomass is EFS. 
 
TABLE B1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Appendix C: Comparative statics 
 
Ecological equilibrium:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
F F
F
zr X K qD h X bqD ah X
X
K qD h X bqD ah X
η γ
γγ
⎡ ⎤− ε − − + − −⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤+ − − + − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
If we define  
( ) ( )(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 FV K qD h X bqD ah X γγ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + − − + − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
and 
 
( ) ( )(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 FW qD h X bqD ah X⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎣ ⎦  
 
then 
 
{ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }211 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1F Fzr X K qD h V zr X K W qD h dXV η ηγ γ γ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − ε − − ⋅ − − ε γ − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
[ ] ( ){ ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) }121 (1 ) (1 ) 1 1 1 (1 )F F F Fzr X K q h X bq ah X V W q h X bq ah X zr X K W dDV η ηγ γ− γ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= − − ε − + − + γ − + − − ε⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
 
Thus 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }{
[ ] ( ) ( )12
(1 ) 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
F F
F
zr X K q h X bq ah XdX
dD V W V zr X K qD h
η γ
− ηγ γ
− ε − + −
=
⎡ ⎤γ − + − ε − −⎣ ⎦
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which is negative as long as [ ] ( )12 (1 ) (1 ) 1 0FV W V zr X K qD h−γ γ⎡ ⎤γ − + − ε − − <⎣ ⎦ . Note that as the 
recruitment function approaches the Beverton Holt shape, the likelihood of a negative 
[ ]W Vγ⎡ ⎤γ −⎣ ⎦  increases.  Moreover, γ≤1 (Beverton-Holt (γ=1) or Cushing (γ<1) recruitement  
function) ensures that [ ] 0W Vγ⎡ ⎤γ − <⎣ ⎦ .  
 
 
 
 
[ ]
[ ]
( )
[ ]
( )
[ ]2
(1 ) (1 ) 1(1 ) (1 ) 1
0
FF
F
zr X K W bqD ahzr K W zr X K bqD ahdX
V VdX V
γ γγ γ ⎡ ⎤− ε γ − −ε − ε − − >⎣ ⎦= − + − <
 
 
 
Economic equilibrium: 
 
 
( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )
2
2
2 2
2
1 1
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
2 1 (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 1 1
2
(1 )(1 )
F
F F
ah bqD X
q h w
h qD X
dD
dX ah X bq h qD X q h X ah bqD X
w
h qD X
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥α − +⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥β − ⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
which is clearly identical with the slope of the equilibrium condition in the case of no 
invasion as long as the economic quality effect is zero (w=0). Moreover, a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for the slope to be steeper in the X-D plane with the economic quality 
effect present is that ( )22 1b bqD> − . Note also that ceteris paribus, when X increases, the slope 
approaches the linear case with no economic quality effect.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Escaped farmed salmon (EFS) in Norwegian fisheries and river spawning stocks, 1989-2003.  
 
 
Year 
 
Total number of 
EFS (1000) 
EFS share of total 
catch in river 
fishery(%) 
EFS share of total 
catch in marine 
fishery (%)* 
EFS share in 
spawning stock 
(%) 
1989 - 7 30 35 
1990 - 7 32 34 
1991 - 5 30 24 
1992 - 5 33 26 
1993 498 5 34 22 
1994 536 4 28 22 
1995 240 5 28 29 
1996 417 7 32 31 
1997 506 9 40 29 
1998 553 9 38 22 
1999 348 6 33 15 
2000 276 7 24 11 
2001 272 7 23 11 
2002 475 16 31 18 
2003 240  18 13 
Average, 
1989-2002 
periode 
 
412 
 
7% 
 
31% 
 
24% 
Source: http://www.miljostatus.no/templates/PageWithRightListing____2236.aspx 
* Un-weighted average, coast+ fjord. 
**Preliminary estimates 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pre- and post-invasion results for stock X (in 1000), number of day permits D( in 1000), price 
of day permits P (1000 NOK), Recreational angler (consumer) surplus AS (1000 NOK), monopoly 
profits π (1000 NOK), and total surplus (TS) for different levels of escaped farmed salmon, EFS (in 
1000). 
Pre- 
invasion 
 
Post-invasion 
 
EFS =0 EFS=2 EFS=4 EFS=6 EFS=8 EFS=10 
X 12.6 13.7 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.5 
D 3.5 3.6 3.4 2.9 2.3 1.6 
P 
AS 
0.5 
727 
0.5 
794 
0.5 
683 
0.4 
501 
0.3 
314 
0.2 
152 
π 
TS 
1453 
2180 
1588 
2382 
1366 
2049 
1003 
1504 
628 
942 
304 
456 
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Table 3: No economic quality effect. Pre- and post-invasion results for stock X (in 1000), number of 
day permits D(in 1000), price of day permits P (1000 NOK), Recreational angler (consumer) surplus 
AS (1000 NOK), monopoly profits π (1000 NOK), and total surplus (TS) for different levels of 
escaped farmed salmon, EFS (in 1000). 
Pre- 
invasion 
 
Post-invasion 
 
EFS =0 EFS=2 EFS=4 EFS=6 EFS=8 EFS=10 
X 12.6 13.3 13.7 13.9 13.9 13.9 
D 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.5 
P 
AS 
0.5 
727 
0.5 
871 
0.5 
982 
0.6 
1070 
0.6 
1141 
0.6 
1199 
π 
TS 
1453 
2180 
1741 
2612 
1964 
2946 
2141 
3211 
2282 
3423 
2397 
3596 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B1: No marine harvest. Pre- and post-invasion results for stock X (in 1000), number of day 
permits D(in 1000), price of day permits P (1000 NOK), Recreational angler (consumer) surplus AS 
(1000 NOK), monopoly profits π (1000 NOK), and total surplus (TS) for different levels of escaped 
farmed salmon, EFS (in 1000). 
Pre- 
invasion 
 
Post-invasion 
 
EFS =0 EFS=2 EFS=4 EFS=6 EFS=8 EFS=10 
X 10.6 12.8 14.4 14.8 14.7 14.5 
D 4.2 4.5 4.2 3.7 3.0 2.3 
P 
AS 
0.6 
1063 
0.6 
1198 
0.6 
1042 
0.5 
808 
0.4 
555 
0.3 
318 
π 
TS 
2127 
3190 
2396 
3594 
2085 
3127 
1616 
2424 
1110 
1665 
635 
953 
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Figure 1: Harvest and reproduction 
Wild salmon, tX , Escaped farmed salmon, 
FX , marine harvest rate, th , river harvest rate, ty  share of 
escaped farmed fish available for marine and river harvest, a  and b , respectively, growth function, 
(..)R , share of recruits surviving from recruitment up to mature age, z, time lag from recruitment to 
maturation age,τ .  
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Figure 2:  Bioeconomic equilibrium.  
Pre-invasion (initial) state: curve 1 depicts the ecological equilibrium and graph 2 illustrates the economic 
equilibrium. Bioeconomic equilibrium is given by X* and D*.   
Post-invasion state: The 1` and 2`curves describes the ecological and economic equilibrium respectively with 
XF>0. Bioeconomic equilibrium is given by X*` and D*`.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Bioeconomic equilibrium. High initial wild stock. 
Pre-invasion (initial) state: curve 1 depicts the ecological equilibrium and graph 2 illustrates the economic 
equilibrium. Bioeconomic equilibrium is given by X* and D*.   
Post-invasion state: The 1` and 2`curves describes the ecological and economic equilibrium respectively with 
XF>0. Bioeconomic equilibrium is given by X*` and D*`.   
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